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I. INTRODUCTION
This fall, the Minnesota Supreme Court heard oral arguments
in the most important punitive damages case in recent memory,
and when it ultimately decides the appeal of Jensen v. Walsh,' it has
the opportunity to reverse the Minnesota Court of Appeals errone-
ous interpretation of Minnesota punitive damages law. The Court
of Appeals' conclusion in Jensen that punitive damages are barred in
all cases that do not involve personal injuries is simply contrary to
longstanding Minnesota law, including case law of all essential ele-
ments of this case law in 1978.
Minnesota's history of allowing punitive damages in every type
of case, whether involving a personal injury or some other type of
t Partner with Yaeger, Jungbauer, Barczak, Roe & Vucinovich, PLC. Ad-
junct Professor at the William Mitchell College of Law. A portion of this article is
adopted from an article originally co-written with James H. Kaster, of Nichols,
Kaster and Anderson, and his expertise, advice and assistance are acknowledged
and gratefully appreciated.
1. 609 N.W.2d 251 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000), rev. granted (June 27, 2000).
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harm, dates back nearly to Minnesota's statehood. In fact, the first
case in Minnesota to uphold an award of punitive damages did not
even involve a personal injury. In Lynd v. Picket,' decided just four
years after Minnesota became a state, the claim was for conversion.
Over one hundred years later, when the Minnesota Legislature
codified Minnesota punitive damages law in 1978, it established a
standard that by its plain language applies to all wrongful conduct
regardless of whether that conduct causes personal injury or some
other type of harm. As originally enacted, the statute provided,
"[p]unitive damages shall be allowed in civil actions only upon
clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show
willful indifference for the rights or safety of others."'
While "safety" obviously incorporates personal injuries, the
term "rights" unquestionably has a far broader reach, its plain
meaning covering every type of claim where the person's rights were
violated, regardless of whether a personal injury is involved.
With this background in mind, this article will examine the se-
ries of five decisions over the past two decades that have led to the
unfortunate current state of punitive damages law in Minnesota,
namely confused, inconsistent, and in some cases (including the
Jensen case currently before the Minnesota Supreme Court), just
plain wrong. This article will examine these five decisions (two
from the Minnesota Supreme Court and three from the Minnesota
Court of Appeals) not only to analyze the "why" but the "how" of
their going astray.
Recognizing that the Minnesota Supreme Court has an inher-
ent role in determining the scope and reach of punitive damages,
one must first attempt to reconcile its two decisions (which prohibit
punitive damages only where property damage was caused by a prod-
uct) with the above longstanding case law and its codification in
Minnesota Statutes section 549.20. While it could be persuasively4
argued that the first of these two cases, dating back to 1982, was
wrongly decided, the case can probably best be understood as re-
flecting the state of products liability law as it existed in 1982. The
second Minnesota Supreme Court case, decided in 1994,5 may
2. 7 Minn. 184 (1862).
3. MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (2000) (emphasis added).
4. Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn.
1982).
5. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 622 v. Keene Corp., 511 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 1994).
1044 [Vol. 27:2
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 53
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss2/53
RIGHT TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MINNESOTA
again be justified as the supreme court's exercise of its supervisory
authority over punitive damages, but in reality, the court based its
decision solely on precedent from its first case and failed entirely to
examine how dramatically the landscape of products liability law
had changed in the intervening 12 years, changes that directly bore
on the underlying rationale in the first case.
In contrast to these supreme court decisions, which at least
have some logical basis, the two court of appeals decisions (includ-
ing Jensen) that have prohibited punitive damages in all non-
personal injury cases, not just products cases, cannot remotely be
justified under any rationale. Unfortunately, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals twice relied on the bare language of a Supreme Court
decision on punitive damages without fully analyzing the context of
that language, and without any examination of either the long his-
tory of punitive damages in Minnesota (including their purpose
and benefit to the public) or the current governing statute. These
two Court of Appeals cases are exhibits "A" and "B" of how taking
language out of context and without analysis and then relying on it
as binding precedent can wreak havoc on the law, and cause confu-
sion and uncertainty that can take years to correct.
II. MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The two Minnesota Supreme Court decisions bearing on this
issue were decided a dozen years apart, first Eisert v. Greenberg Roof-
ing & Sheet Metal Co.,6 followed by Independent School District No. 622
v. Keene Corp.7 In Eisert, a fire in the auto body shop of a school
killed two high school students and also caused property damage to
the school district's building. The decedents' heirs and the school
sued various defendants that had manufactured, sold, or applied
urethane spray foam installation and intumescent paint. This insu-
lation and paint were allegedly the source of the toxic smoke that
killed the two students and the fuel that sustained the fire. Both
the students' heirs and the school sought punitive damages. The
heirs'claim was denied because Minnesota law as it then existed
8prohibited punitive damages in wrongful death claims. The school
6. 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 1982).
7. 511 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 1994).
8. The Minnesota Legislature cured this unfair gap in the law when it
amended Minnesota Statutes section 573.02 in 1983 and specifically provided that
"Punitive damages may be awarded as provided in section 549.20." MINN. STAT. §
2000] 1045
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district's punitive damages claim, based solely on property damage,
was denied on an entirely different basis, namely that its denial
more accurately reflected the underlying principles of Minnesota
punitive damages law. Because the reasoning used to deny the
school district's claim is so important to understanding this issue,
and because it is so brief, it is worthwhile to review it here in its en-
tirety:
The school district's appeal is from an order denying its
motion to amend its complaint to include a claim for pu-
nitive damages against the defendant manufacturers. The
disposition of this motion necessarily raises the issue of
the allowability of punitive damages in strict products liabil-
ity property damage actions, for, if such damages were al-
lowable, leave to amend should have been granted pursu-
ant to Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure section 15.01.
We hold, however, that punitive damages are not recover-
able under a strict products liability theory for property
damage and accordingly affirm the trial court's denial of
the motion to amend. We first awarded punitive damages
in a strict liability action in Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp. In
that case, involving injuries to a child caused by flamma-
ble sleepwear, we said that the 'punitive damages remedy
concerns the vital state interest of protecting persons
against personal injury.' The interests implicated in strict
liability actions for injury solely to property are not so
great as to warrant extension of this controversial remedy
to those actions. 'The very power of the remedy demands
that judges exercise close control over the imposition and
assessment of punitive damages.' Although the nature of
the plaintiff's injury is not always listed as a factor in de-
termining how to assess punitive damages, it may reasona-
bly be taken into account in deciding where punitive
damages will be allowed. Where that injury is limited to
property damage, the public interest in punishment and
deterrence is largely satisfied by the plaintiffs recovery of
compensatory damages. Punitive damages represent an
extraordinary measure of deterrence. Denying their im-
position in this case, after allowing punitive damages in
strict liability actions for personal injury, reflects the higher
value our society places on the safety of persons than it
573.02, subd. 1 (2000).
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does on the security of property.9
Two key points must be kept in mind when analyzing the
above reasoning: (1) it had been only two years since the supreme
court had decided for the very first time, in the landmark Gryc case
involving severe burns to a child from extraordinarily dangerous
sleepwear, that punitive damages could be recovered under a cause
of action, "strict liability," that was theoretically premised upon the
notion of liability without fault (although, in reality, the manufac-
turer's conduct was egregious in the extreme, an internal memo
even stated that the defendant knew it was sitting on a "powder
keg" because the fabric was so dangerous)10 and (2) it would be two
more years before the supreme court would issue the decisions that
would, for the most part, lay rest to this notion that "strict liability"
was in fact liability "without fault." Two years after Eisert, the su-
preme court decided a series of cases that held that "design defect"
and "failure to warn" claims were fundamentally the same regard-
less of whether based on "strict liability" or "negligence," and that,
with the exception of "manufacturing defect" cases, "products li-
abili%" cases were ultimately based on some sort of wrongful con-
duct.
Twelve years after Eisert, and ten years after these landmark
products liability cases of Bilotta v. Kelley Co. and Hauenstein v. Loctite
Corp., the Supreme Court decided Independent School District No. 622
v. Keene Corp.,2 where the only harm was property damage. A
school district sued various defendants (the construction company,
the architect, the contractor, and the manufacturer of the asbestos)
for the cost of removing asbestos from Tartan High School. After a
nineteen-day trial, the jury awarded both compensatory and puni-
tive damages. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reduced the puni-
tive damages award but otherwise affirmed. However, on review,
the Minnesota Supreme Court, based solely on Eisert, rejected the
award of punitive damages in its entirety.
Again, because the Court's reasoning and analysis is so sparse,
9. Eisert, 314 N.W.2d at 228-29 (emphasis added).
10. 297 N.W. 2d at 740.
11. Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984); Hauenstein v. Loctite
Corp., 347 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 1984). For an extended discussion of this critical
concept, see generally Mike Steenson, A Comparative Analysis of Minnesota Products
Liability Law and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 24 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 1 (1998).
12. 511 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 1994).
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it is worthwhile to review it in its entirety:
Keene next challenges the award of punitive damages to
the school district. In Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet
Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Minn. 1992), we held that
punitive damages could not be recovered in a strict prod-
ucts liability action where the plaintiff only suffers prop-
erty damage. Keene argues that the policy concerns un-
derlying Eisert apply in this case, and therefore the school
district's recovery of punitive damages should be barred.
1 3
The school district argues that Eisert only applies to strict
liability claims, and, therefore does not apply to this case
because the school district brought claims under liability
theories beyond strict products liability. We do not find
this to be a sufficient distinguishing factor to limit the ap-
plication of our reasoning in Eisert. As in Eisert, the school
district here only suffered property damage. The remedy
of punitive damages concerns the 'vital state interest of
protecting persons against personal injury,' Gryc v. Dayton-
Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied sub.
nor. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 449 U.S. 921, 101 S. Ct.
320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 149 (1980). We believe now as we did in
Eisert that denying punitive damages where a plaintiff only
suffers property damage reflects the greater importance
society places on protecting people. We reverse the award
of punitive damages in its entirety.
Although this reasoning will be examined further on the ques-
tion of whether the Minnesota Court of Appeals correctly inter-
preted it as extending to all cases not involving personal injuries,
and not just products liability cases, it is very useful at this point to
examine the above language from both Eisert and Keene to note
what these analyses do not contain:
(1) Neither decision engaged in any analysis or review of long-
standing Minnesota case law which (a) had always provided for
punitive damages in every type of case involving intentional harm
or egregious conduct, such as conversion, fraud, libel, wrongful re-
possessions, wrongful polygraph testing prohibited by statute, and
(b) had never required a personal injury.
(2) Neither decision analyzed Minnesota Statutes section
13. Id. at 732.
14. Molenaar v. United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996).
1048 [Vol. 27:2
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549.20, which not only codified Minnesota punitive damages law,
but which also specifically permitted punitive damages when the
"acts of the defendant" demonstrated "willful indifference" (later
changed to "deliberate disregard") for the "rights or safety of oth-
ers.
Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court's analysis in Eisert
(which then became the sole basis for its decision in Keene, and
which emphasized again and again the "strict liability" cause of ac-
tion before it) was limited to its reference to Gryc and its conclusion
that the "interests implicated in strict liability actions for injury solely
to property are not so great as to warrant extension of this controver-
sial remedy to those actions."'6
To put it another way, the supreme court in Eisert viewed the
punitive claim before it as one that required an "extension" of the
law that would permit punitive damages in a claim that was not
even based on "fault." Because Minnesota products liability law
now essentially recognizes "fault" as the governing principle in
most products liability cases regardless of whether plead as "strict
liability" or "negligence," this reasoning is no longer valid.
Consequently, while the following analysis will focus on why
the supreme court will likely reverse Jensen, the court may also re-
visit its reasoning in Eisert and Keene in light of the major changes in
products liability law since Eisert was decided. Ultimately, the su-
preme court would likely agree that neither case accurately reflects
the long history of punitive damages law in Minnesota and the in-
tent of the legislature when it codified this law in 1978, all of which
focused on the egregiousness of the conduct and the rights being
violated, and none of which turned on the nature of the harm
caused. Indeed, both decisions should now be overruled.
III. COURT OF APPEALS' DECISIONS
Since 1994, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has issued three
decisions on the issue at hand (none of which involved injuries
from a product), ruling in two of them, Soucek v. Banham17 and Jen-
15. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y 389 N.W.2d 876, 891 (Minn.
1986) (emphasis added).
16. Eisert, 314 N.W.2d at 229 (emphasis added).
17. 524 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) rev. denied (Jan. 25, 1995) (two to
one decision).
10492000]
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sen v. Walsh, that punitive damages were not permitted in any case
absent a personal injury. In the third decision, Molenaar v. United
Cattle Co.,' 9 it rejected this conclusion and instead ruled that the
damages are permitted in non-injury cases.
These decisions thus produced three opinions applying Eisert
and Keene to non-personal injury, non-products cases, (1) the initial
majority opinion in Soucek in 1994, (2) the dissenting opinion in
Molenaar in 1996, and (3) the unanimous court of appeals decision
in Jensen in 2000 that is now being reviewed by the Minnesota Su-
preme court. Two opinions were written which reject this ap-
proach, (1) the dissenting opinion in Soucek and (2) the majority
opinion in Molenaar.
Because the three opinions rejecting punitive damages, and
the two opinions that would permit it, all take essentially the same
approach, it is worthwhile examining them together. Again, ex-
actly as with the supreme court's decisions in Eisert and Keene, what
is most striking about these decisions rejecting punitive damages is
their complete failure to analyze not only longstanding case law,
but Minnesota's punitive damages statute itself, which directly gov-
erned all of these cases. The majority in Soucek, the dissent in Mole-
naar and the unanimous court in Jensen, all focused solely on Eisert
and Keene, which also never engaged in any analysis of why the stat-
ute would specifically include the terms "rights" in addition to
"safety" if the Minnesota Legislature, when it enacted Minnesota
Statutes section 549.20, meant to instead reject and abandon the long
history in Minnesota of permitting punitive damages in myriad
non-injury types of claims.
In contrast, the dissenting opinion in Soucek, and the majority
opinion in Molenaar, can be credited with properly analyzing not
just the two products liability cases of Eisert and Keene, but the full
scope of Minnesota law on punitive damages, including (1) their
long history, (2) the scope of cases in which punitive damages were
permitted, the (3) the history and scope of Minnesota's punitive
damages statute, particularly the Molenaar court's comprehensive
examination of the legislative treatment (in Minnesota and else-
where) of the scope and intended effect of punitive damages. After
the Molenaar court's thorough and scholarly examination of puni-
tive damages law throughout the country, it stated simply its key
18. 609 N.W.2d 251 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) rev. granted (June 27, 2000).
19. 553 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (two to one decision).
1050 [Vol. 27:2
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finding:
Some states have restricted or otherwise restructured pu-
nitive damages, but we are aware of no state that has abol-
ished punitive damages for injuries to property while al-
lowing punitive damages for personal injury.
In light of the vast differences in their approaches, as well
as their conclusions, it is important to examine these three
decisions in detail.
A. Soucek v. Banham
In Soucek, Minneapolis police had chased, shot and killed Mr.
Banham's pet dog. (Indeed, the police did not merely kill the dog,
claiming that they thought it was a wolf, but allegedly took pictures
of themselves in "hunting poses," holding up his dead pet almost as
a trophy.)" In Minnesota, animals are considered personal prop-
erty, and the issue presented was whether the destruction of per-
sonal property would warrant punitive damages. While the Minne-
sota Supreme Court had squarely addressed this precise question
and held that a municipality could be liable for punitive damages
for unlawfully killing an animal in Wilson v. City ofEagan,2" the Court
of Appeals in Soucek found a conflict between the 1980 Wilson and
the 1994 Keene decision. Recognizing that Wilson squarely permit-
ted the punitive damages sought in Soucek, the Court of Appeals
examined Keene and found that "allowing punitive damages when
the plaintiff suffers only property damage was later expressly prohib-
ited by Keene. "B
Rejecting the dissenting opinion's approach, which properly
analyzed longstanding case law and Minnesota Statutes section
549.20, and which consequently limited Keene's holding to cases in-
volving injuries from products, the majority opinion instead merely
quoted from Keene where the supreme court concluded:
[tlhat denying punitive damages where a plaintiff only
suffers property damage reflects the greater importance
society places on protecting people. Given the Supreme
20. Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
21. STAR TRIB., April 23, 1993, at lB.
22. 297 N.W.2d 146,147-51 (Minn. 1980) (the animal warden killed a pet cat
immediately after impounding it in contravention of a municipal ordinance that
mandated it be held for five days before destruction).
23. Soucek v. Banham, 524 N.W.2d 478, 479 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis
added).
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Court's rationale in Keene, we see no basis for distinguish-
ing tortious conduct in the production or distribution of a
product from other tortious conduct. It is frequently only
fortuitous that a product causes property damage without
also causing personal injury. It is not apparent why a tort-
feasor whose product fortuitously causes only property
damage should avoid punitive damages when a tortfeasor
whose conduct is not associated with a product, but causes
only property damage, should not.
If punitive damages could not be recovered in Keene when
a defective product [asbestos] had to be replaced solely
because it created a health hazard for humans, we see no
basis for permitting punitive damages when tortious con-
duct damages property without creating a risk of personal
injury. Permitting punitive damages under these circum-
stances would not serve the deterrent purpose of protect-
ing persons against personal injury.24
The dissent acknowledged the court's language in Keene could
be "broadly read to support" the majority holding, but correctly
recognized that this reading was not "the logical interpretation."
Instead, the dissent found that the language from Keene must be
read in context, and had four very specific reasons why the majority
was wrong.
1. The dissent pointed to the court's syllabus in Keene and,
noting that the supreme court author also wrote the syllabus,
pointed out that this syllabus specifically referred to "products" as
part of its holding. The syllabus stated, "absent personal injury, a
party injured by a product may not recover punitive damages."
25
2. The dissent pointed out how Keene had not even ad-
dressed or analyzed the plain language of Minnesota Statutes sec-
tion 549.20, referring to the "rights and safety of others," and noted
that while the supreme court may have the power to limit a 'judi-
cially-created remedy," this limitation could not be done without an
analysis of the statute itself, "particularly since the elimination of an
entire category of punitive damages would be a restriction of com-
mon law remedies available at the time the statute codified punitive
damages.,263. The dissent explained how the majority opinion failed to
24. Id. at 480-81.
25. Id. at 481.
26. Idat 481-82.
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analyze or refer to the long line of Minnesota decisions allowing
punitive damages for intentional property damage, and that while
the product related limitation on punitive damages may be consistent
with developments in other states, the limitation in these other
states of punitive damages was never based on a division based
solely on "whether the injury is to person or property."2 7
4. Finally, the dissent discussed how the majority's distinc-
tion between injury to person or property was inconsistent with the
philosophy of punitive damages, namely punishment and deter-
rence, stating "to rest the availability of punitive damages solely on
the type of injury contradicts the underlying philosophy because it
focuses on the consequences of the action rather than on the ac-
tual conduct."28
B. Molenaar v. United Cattle Co.
In Molenaar, the injury was again to property, not person, and
in this case, the defendant wrongfully (very wrongfully) converted
cattle belonging to plaintiff Molenaar. The defendant then relied
on Soucek, Keene and Eisert in claiming that it could not be liable for
punitive damages. The majority opinion in Molenaar engaged in an
analysis far broader than the dissent in Soucek and examined not
only the history of Minnesota punitive damages law and Minne-
sota's statute, but also punitive damages law from throughout the na-
tion. Ultimately, the court of appeals limited Keene's holding to
product-related injuries, finding that this approach:
reestablishes consistency between case law and statutory
law. The statute governing punitive damages, enacted in
1978, provides that 'punitive damages shall be allowed in
civil actions only upon clear and convincing evidence that
the acts of the defendant show deliberate disregard for
the rights or safety of others.' The statute codified exist-
ing law. Punitive damages for property injury continued
to be available after enactment of the statute.
In addition to authorizing punitive damages in civil ac-
tions, the statute specifically permits punitive damages for
'deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others.'
Violations of rights do not necessarily involve personal in-
juries. Conversion, for instance, generally violates prop-
27. Id.
28. Id.
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erty rights without personal harm to the owner. By in-
cluding disregard of rights as well as disregard of safety, the
statute permits punitive damages for both property dam-
age and personal injury. Any court decision that abolished
punitive damages for disregarding the rights of others would
eviscerate the statute.2
Finally, the majority opinion in Molenaar recognized that with-
out this economic deterrence of those who had violated the rights
of others, insufficient sanctions existed to deter this conduct.
Absent punitive damages, one who intentionally and
wrongfully takes another's property has little to fear. The
worst civil consequence is that the converted property
must be returned to its proper owner. Even this remedy
may be discounted by the possibility that the owner will
not seek legal recovery or will not prevail. Universal aboli-
tion of punitive damages for property damage dramati-
cally improves the profitability of theft and diminishes so-
ciety's reinforcement of personal accountability. Some
states have restricted or otherwise restructured punitive
damages, but we are aware of no state that has abolished
punitive damages for injuries to property while allowing
punitive damages for personal injury.
C. Jensen v. Walsh
In its most recent decision in Jensen, the court of appeals dealt
with a case that involved a mixture of injury and property claims.
An ongoing dispute between two neighboring families led to claims
of both intentional. infliction of emotional distress and intentional
damage to property. On the personal injury claims, both the trial
court and the court of appeals found insufficient evidence of their
emotional distress. On the issue of whether the associated property
damage claims would permit a punitive damages claim, the court
noted the two different interpretations of Keene by the Soucek and
Molenaar panels, and after very briefly noting their holdings, the
court of appeals went no further than did the Soucek court itself.
The Jensen court never itself engaged in any analysis or comparison
of the reasoning outlined in the Soucek dissent and Molenaarmajor-
29. Molenaar v. United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424, 428-29 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996) (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 429.
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ity opinion. Exactly as did the Soucek majority, the Jensen Court
went no further than quoting the language of Keene (taken from
the Gryc flammable pajamas case where a child suffered severe burn
injuries, and non-injury punitive damages were never at issue), which
emphasized the "vital state interest of protecting persons against
personal injury."
Finally, the Jensen court rejected the argument that Keene was
overturned by a subsequent human rights act case, Feltz v. Common-
wealth Land Title Insurance Co.," concluding instead that since Keene
was not even mentioned in Feltz, and since Feltz dealt only with the
issue of whether punitive damages were properly recoverable under
a Minnesota Human Rights Act case where the statute provided for
double of actual damages, Keene was still good law.32 Ultimately, the
court of appeals in Soucek and Jensen is wrong for the most simple
and basic of reasons, is has improperly stripped longstanding rights
from Minnesota citizens without a clear and compelling basis to
support its actions. Indeed, it is difficult to think of another cir-
cumstance where courts have so unjustly taken away such long-
standing rights from citizens without ever examining the history of
those rights or the legislation that was intended to codify those
rights.
IV. THE MINNESOTA LAW THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ANALYZED BY
THE COURT OF APPEALS
A. The Common Law And Minnesota Statutes Section 549.20
Prior to the statutory enactment of Minnesota Statutes section
549.20 in 1978, punitive damages in Minnesota were governed by
common law. Both before and after the enactment of this statute,
punitive damages were found to be recoverable in a wide variety of
actions, some involving injuries and death, and some not,33 includ-
ing intentional torts, products liability,35 civil rights, 6 wrongful
31. 537 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1995).
32. Jensen, 609 N.W.2d at 255.
33. Parents could not recover punitive damages for the sexual abuse of their
minor child. Father A v. Moran, 469 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). Punitive
damages are also not recoverable in an action on contract. Hanks v. Hubbard
Broad., Inc., 493 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
34. E.g., Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1982).
35. E.g., Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Minn. 1989);
Gryc v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 297 N.W. 2d 27 (Minn. 1980).
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37 . 38
death, Injuries and death caused by drunk drivers, sexual abuse
by clergy, forcing employees to take lie detector tests in violation40 •. 41
of state statute, an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty to clients,. . . 42 43
employment discrimination, 2 defamation, and breaches of fiduci-
ary duty between shareholders.""
Before Eisert, while many issues concerning punitive damages
came before the courts and the legislature, whether punitive dam-
ages should be barred in non-personal injury cases was not among
them, an omission most conspicuous because of the scope and
breadth of the subject covered by the common law and the statute.
The legislature's enactment of Minnesota Statutes section 549.20 in
197845 was not only a recognition of the validity and appropriate-
ness of punitive damages in Minnesota, but even more important to
the issue at hand, it was an attempt to provide the broad outlines of
the conduct and circumstances where societal interests were served
46,
by punitive damages as well as meaningful standards for their use.
36. E.g., State Dept. of Human Rights v. Douglas County Auditor, 347 N.W.2d
541 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
37. E.g., Nachtsheim v. Wartnick, 411 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1987).
38. E.g., Hawkins v. Geyer, 352 N.W.2d 784 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Anderson
v. Amundson, 354 N.W.2d 895 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
39. E.g., Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
40. Bucko v. First Minn. Savings Bank, 471 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 1991). But see
Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing and Eng'g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1987)
(punitive damages may be awarded in cases of defamation per se, even absent proof
of actual damages).
41. E.g., Fieldler v. Adams, 466 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
42. E.g., State by Cooper v. Moorhead State Univ., 455 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990).
43. While the application of punitive damages is not different for defamation
claims, there are some unusual rules of availability. For example, punitive dam-
ages may be awarded in cases of defamation per se, even absent proof of actual
damages. Becker, 401 N.W.2d at 661. This is contrary to the general rule, and pro-
vides a liberal basis for making such awards in defamation claims. Bucko, 471
N.W.2d at 98. However, in Lewis v. Equitable Life Ins. Assoc., 389 N.W.2d 876, 892
(Minn. 1986), the supreme court reversed an award of punitive damages in a
defamation action involving so-called compelled self-publication, and stated that
punitive damages should not be recognized in this newly recognized cause of ac-
tion; see also Bradley v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 471 N.W.2d 670, 678-79 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991).
44. Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 779-80 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
45. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, Ch. 738. 1978 Minn. Laws 838-39; see also Diane C.
Heins, Statutory Changes in Minnesota Tort Law-1978, HENNEPIN CoUNTY LAWYER, 6,
Sept-Oct, 1978 at 48.
46. These statutory standards further insure that an award of punitive dam-
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It is also important to note that while the Minnesota legislature has
expressly permitted the award of punitive damages under certain
other statutes, such as workers compensation, violations of the48 49
trade secrets act,4 8 and employment discrimination, Section
549.20 was the first (and only) legislation to deal broadly with the
application of punitive damages to all civil cases.
Section 549.20 was designed to govern four separate aspects of
punitive damages (none of which excluded any type or category of
case). With the exception of the standards for the type of conduct
that justifies an award of punitive damages, these four aspects are
not going to be discussed in detail here, for their importance lies in
what they do not do, i.e. separate out non-personal injury cases.
These four aspects governing punitive damages are:
(a) The standard of proof required by a plaintiff°;
(b) The standards of conduct in which the defendant must
engage to be liable for punitive damages;
(c) The factors that bear on the amount of punitive damages,5'
ages does not violate due process. GN Danavox, Inc. v. Starkey Labs., Inc., 476
N.W.2d 172, 177 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, (1991)).
47. MINN. STAT. § 176.183(1) of The Worker's Compensation Act provides for
punitive damages by the state treasurer against a non-insured employer, in an
amount not to exceed 50 percent of all monies paid out.
48. Zawels v. Edutronics, Inc., 520 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
49. Ulrich v. City of Crosby, 848 F. Supp. 861,876 (D. Minn. 1994).
50. Under the statute, a plaintiff can recover punitive damages only upon a
showing of "clear and convincing evidence." The failure to instruct a jury that
clear and convincing evidence is required under the statutory standard is reversi-
ble error. Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing and Eng'g Co., 402 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Minn.
1987). The common law standard required only a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the same as for other forms of civil litigation. The statute's heightened
burden is a recognition of the quasi-criminal or "punitive" nature of punitive
damages. Indeed, the Senate author of Minnesota Statutes section 549.20, Senator
Davies, noted the quasi-criminal nature of punitive damages when discussing the
higher standard. See tape of meeting on H.F. 338 before the Minnesota Senate
Judiciary Committee (Feb. 22, 1978). By using a standard of proof that lies be-
tween the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for criminal cases, and the "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard for most other forms of civil litigation, the
legislature attempted to provide additional safeguards surrounding an award of
punitive damages.
51. Once ajury is properly instructed on the standard of conduct and proof
for an award of punitive damages, the amount of the award is for the finder of
fact. The draft version of Minnesota Statute section 549.20 followed the common
law in allowing the trier of fact to determine whether punitive damages should be
awarded. However, the draft version had the court, rather than the jury, deter-
mine the amount of the damage award. As enacted, Minnesota Statute section
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(d) A principal's liability for the acts of its agent.
B. Statutory Standard Of Defendant's Conduct
Under the common law, the courts defined the conduct neces-
sary as "willful," "wanton," "malicious disregard for the rights of
others," "willful and reckless," "willful, wanton or maliciously," and
"willful, wanton and reckless. "5  Indeed, the attempt to concisely
549.20 was changed from its draft version so that the amount remained with the
trier of fact, whether it was the court orjury. The rationale underlying having the
court decide the amount was stated as follows by an influential law professor: First,
it would reduce the probability that punitive damage awards might be unduly in-
fluenced by emotion, as most judges are presumably more detached in their de-
liberation and therefore more likely to render an objective damage assessment.
Further, evidence of the defendant's wealth that could prejudice the jury on the
issue of liability could then be excluded from jury consideration. Finally, trial
judges usually have a more sophisticated appreciation than jurors of the often far-
reaching effects that punitive awards may have on the operations of a particular
corporate defendant. David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1258, 1320 (1976).
The factors to be used for making such an award are:
(1) the seriousness of the hazard to the public arising from the defen-
dant's misconduct;
(2) the profitability of the misconduct by the defendant;
(3) the duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it;
(4) the degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard and of its ex-
cessiveness;
(5) the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the mis-
conduct;
(6) the number and level of employees involved with the misconduct;
(7) the financial condition of the defendant;
(8) the total effect of other punishment likely to be suffered by the de-
fendant as a result of the misconduct, including compensatory and other
damage awards to the plaintiff and other similarly situated persons; and
(9) the severity of any criminal penalty to which the defendant may be
subject.
Id. at 1319.
There is no specified weight to be given to any of these factors, nor is
there an upper limit in Minnesota on the amount of punitive damages. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court does not disturb an award of punitive damages unless that
award is so excessive as to be unreasonable. Stuempges v. Parke-Davis & Co., 297
N.W.2d 252, 259 (Minn. 1980). Though the court has, on its own, reduced awards
of punitive damages where it concluded that justice was best served by reducing
the award rather than by granting a new trial. Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 837 (Minn. 1988).
52. While the terms "willful," "wanton," "malicious" and "reckless" are the
most common, the Supreme Court has on occasion used a multitude of descrip-
tions for conduct justifying punitive damage awards. In Anderson v. International
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define the conduct required for an award of penalty-type damages
began with Lynd v. Picket.53 There, the Minnesota Supreme Court
said a certain level of malice was required, defined by the court as:
Whatever is done.. .willfully and purposefully, if it be at
the same time wrong and unlawful, and that known to the
party, is in legal contemplation malicious. That which is
done contrary to one's own conviction of duty, or with a
willful disregard for the rights of others, whether it be to
encompass some unlawful end, or some lawful ends by
some unlawful means, or, in the language of the charge,
to do a wrong or unlawful act, knowing it to be such, con-
stitutes legal malice. 54
Since Lynd, Minnesota courts have struggled to determine the
level of animus or state of mind necessary to justify such an award.
Possibly because the standard seemed elusive, the Minnesota Legis-
lature attempted to define the standard (and also, as noted above,
provide guidance on numerous aspects of punitive damages claims
to help determine when the imposition of punitive damages was
appropriate). Minnesota Statutes section 549.20 in 1978 replaced
the varied common law standards (i.e., malice, willful, reckless,
wanton) with a single standard, that the defendant's act(s) showed
a "willful indifference to the rights and safety of others." In 1990,
"willful indifference" was changed to a "deliberate disregard" stan-
dard, and the legislature also attempted to now define the stan-
dard, providing in subsection (b) that:
A defendant has acted with deliberate disregard for the
rights and safety of others if the defendant has knowledge
of facts or intentionally disregards facts that create a high
probability of injury to the rights or safety of others and:
(1) deliberately proceeds to act in conscious or inten-
tional disregard of the high degree of probability of injury
of the rights or safety of others; or
(2) deliberately proceeds to act with indifference to the
Harvestor Co., 116 N.W. 101, 102 (1908), the court stated the standards as "wanton,
malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive, and such as to show a reckless disregard for
the rights of the plaintiff," and additionally stated that "punitive damage recovery
is generally permitted when the tort is committed with cruelty, oppression, insult,
or such gross negligence as to justify the interference of malice as a matter of law."
53. 1862WL 1259 (Minn.July Term 1862).
54. Id. at"13.
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high probability of injury to the rights or safety of others.55
The obvious question when examining these standards in light
of the issue at hand is a simple one, namely, did the Legislature,
when carefully considering and enacting these standards, ever in-
tended to bar or limit in any way punitive damages in non-personal
injury cases? To put it another way, can any reading of this statu-
tory language reach this result, and if the answer is "no" (and no
reasonable person could conclude otherwise), what does this say
about the Legislature's intent? The only answer that can be dis-
cerned from the plain language of the standard and the focus of
the cases interpreting the standard is that the type of harm caused
by the wrongful conduct is not the proper focus, but instead, it is
the defendant's conduct that must be the subject of the inquiry.
In two of the leading cases defining the 1978 and 1990 stan-
dards, neither plaintiff had suffered a personal injury. In Wirig v.
56Kinney Shoe Corp., 6 the employee had publicly been wrongly ac-
cused of theft. Bucko v. First Minnesota Savings Bank,57 concerned
violations of the Minnesota polygraph statute, and the bank defen-
dant argued that it could not be liable for punitive damages be-
cause it did not "actually know of the polygraph statute when they
violated it."58 The court of appeals determined that because the
bank had no actual knowledge of the statute prior to two of the
employees' tests, the bank could not be liable for punitive damages
to those two employees.9
At the supreme court, this determination-that specific
knowledge of the law was required for an award of punitive dam-
ages-was reversed. The court ruled: "This court has never con-
cluded that a defendant must have actual knowledge of the law in
order to be willfully indifferent to the rights of others and thereby
55. MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1990). The fact that these provisions are written in
the alternative, that is, "either or" is sufficient to justify an award, does little to clar-
ify the standard for punitive damages. The first seems to require action which is
deliberate or in conscious or intentional disregard, the second requires only that
the action be with "indifference" to the high probability of injury.
56. 461 N.W.2d 374, 381 (Minn. 1990).
57. 471 N.W.2d 95, 97-98 (Minn. 1991).
58. Id. at 97.
59. Bucko v. First Minn. Savings Bank, 452 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990). The court of appeals also determined that the third employee could re-
cover punitive damages even though she did not recover any compensatory dam-
ages. Id. This specific ruling was reversed on appeal to the supreme court. Bucko,
471 N.W.2d at 97.
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liable for punitive damages. We are not persuaded that we should
do so now.
6 0
While the scope of the standard was at issue in both Wirig and
Bucko, what was not at issue in either case was the threshold ques-
tion of whether a defendant who has not caused a personal injury
could be even liable for punitive damages. So settled was the law
on this subject that it was not an issue for the defendants or the
court.
V. CONCLUSION
In retrospect and with hindsight, one can see how the Minne-
sota Supreme Court started down the wrong road in Eisert, and by
the time it decided Keene twelve years later, it was too far past the
fork in the road to see that it had made a wrong turn. However,
the court of appeals cannot rely on that same justification, because
in none of the cases in which it barred punitive damages had the
damage been caused by a product as in Eisert and Keene. The exten-
sion of these decisions to bar the types of punitive damage claims
that had been upheld for nearly as long as Minnesota has been a
state was completely unwarranted. Fortunately, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court is now in a position to remedy the situation, and when
it takes a close look at the long history of punitive damages in Min-
nesota, the intent of the Legislature in enacting section 549.20, and
most important, the benefit to the public that punitive damages
provide in deterring wrongful conduct by punishing wrongdoers,
the court not only has the opportunity to reverse Jensen v. Walsh,
but to also consider overruling Eisert and Keene.
60. Bucko, 471 N.W.2d at 98.
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